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Abstract
Between 1984 and his death in 1998, German sociologist Niklas
Luhmann developed a comprehensive theory of what he called autopoi-
etic or self-referential systems. He worked out this approach both at the
level of a social system as a whole and at the level of various social sub-
systems, such as state, economy, science, religion, education, art, family,
and—the concern of the present article—law. My particular topics in
this critical introduction to Luhmann’s theory are (a) its relation to
more standard legal theory, (b) foundational or self-referential prob-
lems in law, and (c) the problem of law’s relation to other social spheres,
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INTRODUCTION
This article presents a largely sympathetic
overview of a sociological approach to law
that is influential on the Continent but still
mostly unknown to Americans, whether aca-
demic lawyers or sociologists of law. The ap-
proach is through a particular variant of so-
ciological systems theory first developed by
German sociologist Niklas Luhmann. For his
work of the 1960s and 1970s, Luhmann earned
recognition as a theorist of society’s differ-
entiation into functional subsystems (such as
the economy, politics, science, education, re-
ligion, and also law) (see Luhmann 1982). First
trained as a lawyer, Luhmann was known in
particular for his work in the sociology of law
[see Luhmann 1985 (1972)].
Beginning with work published in 1984,
however, Luhmann retooled his theory to
incorporate ideas of autopoietic systems—to
be explained below—that were developed
originally in biological research of the early
1970s. He first published a book setting out
general principles for a theory of autopoietic
social systems [see Luhmann 1995 (1982)].
He then set out writing book-length studies
of the various societal subsystems he had
earlier distinguished. Most relevant for our
purposes, in 1993 he published Das Recht der
Gesellschaft, translated eleven years later as
Law as a Social System [Luhmann 2004 (1993)].
In 1997, the last year of his life, Luhmann
published a two-volume restatement of the
general principles of autopoietic social theory
(oddly titled Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft). In
December 2012, an English translation of the
first volume appeared, entitled The Theory of
Society, Volume 1 [Luhmann 2012 (1997)].
My strategy is to rely here almost entirely
on Law as a Social System and Theory of Society. I
have two reasons: First, Law as a Social System is
Luhmann’s most definitive statement of
autopoietic law and makes it unnecessary
to address the various warm-up essays he
published on the subject during the 1980s and
early 1990s. Similarly, his 1997 capstone two-
volume study, available so far only as Theory
of Society, Volume 1, is a definitive and final
statement of Luhmann’s general theoretical
principles. My second reason for referring
almost exclusively to these two works is to make
it easier for interested readers to follow up on
this essay. It will be sufficient for almost all of
them to read only those two books (as well as
Volume 2 of Theory of Society, once it appears).
In what follows, I first address Luhmann’s
immensely challenging general principles and
then take up his examination of the legal system
in particular.
BASIC PRINCIPLES
OF LUHMANN’S LATER WORK
Luhmann sometimes described his later work
as focusing not on objects but on distinctions
[Luhmann 2004 (1993), p. 67; 2012 (1997),
p. 28]. The basic distinction of Luhmann’s work
is between system and environment. This dis-
tinction is of a sort that Luhmann dubs a form,
by which he means a distinction in which one
side is intrinsically bound up with the other.
The notion of a system, he observes, implies
a distinction between it and what lies beyond
its boundary, that is, its environment. Viewed
from the other side of the system/environment
form, an environment is an environment only
with respect to a system.
Luhmann distinguishes among living,
psychic, and social systems. By living systems,
he means (for our purposes) living bodies, and
by psychic systems, he understands individual
consciousnesses. Luhmann identifies different
levels of social systems, including face-to-face
interactions and organizations. At the most
encompassing end of the spectrum, Luhmann
refers to society, or the societal system, and
he is emphatic that these (equivalent) terms
mean world society, not a territorial state or
any other smaller-scale collectivity.
(World) society is primarily differentiated
into various subsystems that perform some
unique function. Among these functional sub-
systems, Luhmann identifies the economy, pol-











































































 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2670049 
LS09CH08-Baxter ARI 26 September 2013 12:16
mass media, and the family.1 Most of these
subsystems, too, “operate independently of
spatial boundaries” [Luhmann 2012 (1997),
p. 96].2 Luhmann describes the political system,
however, as partly regionally and not simply
functionally differentiated—that is, organized
in part by territory [Luhmann 2004 (1993),
p. 484]. The legal system, too, is for him territo-
rially differentiated into different legal orders.
Nonetheless, he writes, we still can speak of
a global legal system—albeit one largely with-
out centralized legislation or decision-making
capacity (pp. 468, 481–82). Luhmann goes be-
yond many theories of globalization in reject-
ing the idea of world society as a global system
of nation-states [Luhmann 2012 (1997), p. 10].
Territorial states, he says, are simply not social
systems in his sense of the term [Luhmann 2004
(1993), p. 480].
A focus on systems has been prominent in
social theory for decades. The version of so-
cial systems theory probably best known to le-
gal theorists—and Luhmann’s usual foil—is the
open systems approach developed during the
1960s under the influence of advances in cyber-
netics and information theory. This generation
of social systems theorists emphasized the per-
meability of the boundary between system and
environment. Inputs to and outputs from the
system regularly cross the system boundary in
a relation of exchange or interchange between
system and environment (see, e.g., Easton 1965,
pp. 25–26; Buckley 1967, p. 50.) Through this
process, the system receives inputs from its en-
vironment, processes them, and converts them
into outputs fed back to the environment. In
turn, information about the outputs’ effects on
the environment and the system flows back into
1For a fine account of the relation between Luhmann’s idea of
differentiation and Weber’s conception of cultural and social
rationalization, see Michailakis (1995).
2Luhmann [2012 (1997), p. 96] writes that “only the polit-
ical system along with the legal system of modern society
can be regionally differentiated in the form of states.” Other-
wise, Luhmann understands regional differences as just “dif-
ferences in the involvement in and reaction to the dominant
structures of the world system of society” (p. 96).
the system, completing the feedback loop (see
Easton 1965, pp. 29–32).
In contrast to virtually all sociological sys-
tems theory developed before his autopoietic
turn in 1982, Luhmann refers to systems not
primarily as open but as operatively closed
or normatively closed—though, to complicate
matters, also as cognitively open. Consider first
what Luhmann means by operative or norma-
tive closure. He sees the societal system and
its subsystems not as associations among indi-
vidual persons—the traditional conception of
society—but as a network of operations. These
operations are communications. Through com-
munication, society carries itself forth and re-
produces itself as a system. Given Luhmann’s
definition of society as a network of communi-
cations, the idea that it is closed by those opera-
tions called communications is a tautology. The
boundary between societal system and nonso-
cial environment is the boundary between com-
munications and noncommunications. Accord-
ing to Luhmann, information does not enter
from the environment into the system; instead,
information always is produced internally,
within the system, according to procedures and
standards and criteria proper to that system it-
self [Luhmann 2004 (1993), pp. 37, 116]. Yet,
Luhmann says repeatedly, this idea of operative
closure—the idea that communications within
a system link directly only to other communi-
cations within that same system—is consistent
with the idea of causal relations between sys-
tem and environment [Luhmann 2004 (1993),
pp. 34, 74; 2012 (1997), pp. 70, 80, 105, 381,
477]. Luhmann’s theory, however, does not fo-
cus on system/environment relations as causal
relations.
A system’s operative closure is the basis
for its autonomy or autopoiesis.3 The term
autopoiesis means literally self-production
[Luhmann 2012 (1997), p. 52]. Autopoietic
systems produce themselves—their operations
and their structures—through their own
3Luhmann seems often, though not always, to use the terms
interchangeably.
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operations. So much is a tautological conse-
quence of operative closure [Luhmann 2004
(1993), p. 78]. Luhmann rejects emphatically
the idea of relative autonomy or relative
autopoiesis (see pp. 95–98). Either a system
is autonomous and autopoietic, or it is not.
He rejects the idea of relative autonomy as
essentially useless because it is a purely negative
formulation that excludes nothing (pp. 96 n.47,
390 n.29, 467 n.19). As long as we conceive
of autonomy as freedom from external causal
influence, then it would seem clearly mean-
ingful to speak of relative autonomy, that is, of
autonomy, so conceived, as a matter of degree.
And Luhmann admits that his own notion of
autopoiesis is not by itself rich in explanatory
power [Luhmann 2012 (1997), p. 32]. But
Luhmann’s theory, recall, is not a causal theory.
Though not denying a system’s dependence on
its environment, Luhmann’s basic theoretical
decision is to investigate societal systems from
within and define them in terms of their own
operations (the communications that are each
system’s elements). And so for Luhmann’s ob-
jectives, the causality-based notions of relative
autonomy or relative autopoiesis are useless.4
The idea of autopoiesis was introduced in
1972 by biologists Humberto Maturana and
Francisco Varela. Beginning from laboratory
work on visual cognition in frogs and pigeons,
they sought to develop a general theory of living
systems [see Maturana & Varela 1980 (1972),
pp. xiv–xvi]. An obvious question for Luhmann
is whether the theory can be extended to so-
cial systems. Does Luhmann’s work rest on a
giant but unsustainable biological metaphor?
Why would we think that the same principles
will be illuminating both for cell biology and
for a theory of world society?
Luhmann insists that the idea of autopoiesis
is neither analogy nor biological metaphor
4He does allow that one can use an input/output schema
“as a crudely simplified model in order to sort out facts”
[Luhmann 2012 (1997), p. 382 n.5]. But “for the sociological
perspective and especially for systems-theoretical analysis,
causal explanations are so difficult that they are inadvisable
at the level of general theoretical propositions” (p. 344).
[Luhmann 2012 (1997), p. 42; see also
Luhmann 2004 (1993), p. 83]. Instead, it is in
the nature of a hypothesis. “All that matters,”
he says, is whether it can generate further
hypotheses that will lead to “fruitful science”
[Luhmann 2012 (1997), p. 83 n.11]. I will
follow that approach here, leaving it to the
reader to determine whether Luhmann’s work
can produce fruitful insights.
In further specifying his basic idea of au-
topoiesis as operative closure, Luhmann de-
scribes societal subsystems as closed with re-
spect to a code. By code, Luhmann means a
distinction between two opposed values, such
as true/false for the scientific system and le-
gal/illegal for the legal system. The code de-
fines the societal subsystem’s unity and is
unique to that system (at least as a code)
[Luhmann 2004 (1993), pp. 118–19]. All sub-
system communication is organized with re-
spect to this code. For some subsystems,
Luhmann identifies media—his full term
is symbolically generalized communications
media—that implement the subsystem’s code.
The function of such media is to motivate com-
municative acceptance (p. 193). Money, for the
economic system, and power, for the political
system, are the clearest examples of such me-
dia. For some subsystems, Luhmann identifies
primary and secondary media and codes. The
economic system, for example, has a primary
medium of property (with a binary code of own-
ing/not owning) and a secondary medium of
money (whose code is pay/not pay) [Luhmann
2012 (1997), pp. 207, 220; see also Luhmann
2004 (1993), pp. 391, 393]. The political sys-
tem’s primary medium of power is secondarily
coded through the medium of law [Luhmann
2012 (1997), p. 220]. These secondary media
and codes have developed only in some sub-
systems and only in the most recent stages of
social evolution. Luhmann describes them as
“indispensable for the modern rationality and
distinctness of the corresponding media codes”
(p. 220).
Luhmann gives two reasons why subsys-
tems’ codes must be binary. First, he suggests
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yes/no, acceptance/rejection structure of all
communication (pp. 62, 135, 190, 276). Sec-
ond, he maintains that a code with more than
two values would be too complex for decision
[Luhmann 2004 (1993), pp. 185, 427]. With a
binary code, by contrast, the negation of one
code value (e.g., true) allows crossing to the
other code value (false) [Luhmann 2012 (1997),
p. 216]. This crossing from one code value to
the other is a special case of a more general no-
tion: crossing as a transition from a marked or
indicated side of a distinction (generally a pos-
itive value) to the unmarked or nonindicated
side (generally a negative value). System media,
such as money and power, facilitate the cross-
ing that is essential to systems’ operation—or
at least some systems’ operation (p. 24).5
The counterconcept to the idea of code is
the idea of program. This notion is the basis for
Luhmann’s idea of systems’ cognitive openness.
As a rule for allocating code values [Luhmann
2004 (1993), p. 118; 2012 (1997), p. 217], a pro-
gram is a way of combining closure (the code)
with openness (conditions that are predicates
for allocating code values). In an alternative
formulation, Luhmann [2004 (1993), p. 196]
describes programs as combining self-reference
with external reference. The clearest example
of a legal program is a statute, particularly
when put in the classical, conditional form that
Luhmann prefers: If such-and-such facts
obtain, then the legal consequence is legal
or illegal (p. 111). Other examples of legal
programs are court decisions and contracts
[Luhmann 2012 (1997), p. 226]. Programming
allows all the various system-relevant values
excluded from the code to be part of the
system’s communication [Luhmann 2004
(1993), p. 186]. The system’s code is invariant;
its programs are variable [Luhmann 2004
(1993), p. 217; 2012 (1997), p. 195]. Luhmann,
ever the lover of paradox, maintains that a
5Love and art—and those are systems on Luhmann’s
analysis—have codes that do not facilitate crossing in this way
[Luhmann 2012 (1997), p. 220]. For a thorough and insightful
account of Luhmann’s idea of crossing, see Philippopoulos-
Mihalopoulos (2010), pp. 11–58.
system’s (operative) closure is the basis for its
(cognitive) openness [Luhmann 2004 (1993),
p. 34; 2012 (1997), p. 110].
But if Luhmann does not want to investi-
gate causal relations between societal subsys-
tems, such as those between economy and law,
then how are these systems related to one an-
other? Luhmann approaches this question with
three basic concepts: irritation, structural cou-
pling, and coevolution.
By irritation, Luhmann [2004 (1993),
pp. 258–59, 383; 2012 (1997), p. 66] means a
system-internal event, though one occasioned
by the environment. Events in a system’s envi-
ronment may present anomalies, surprises, or
disappointments, relative to the expectations
that have arisen “from the history of the system”
[Luhmann 2004 (1993), p. 383]. Thus although
it is the environment that irritates the system,
the system’s structures determine which envi-
ronmental events will count as irritations. The
system’s capacity for irritability is its resonance,
described in other theories as responsiveness
to the environment [Luhmann 2012 (1997),
p. 219].
A system’s degree of resonance is deter-
mined by what Luhmann calls its structural
couplings. Luhmann defines structural cou-
pling as a link between system and environment
through which the system “presupposes certain
features of its environment and relies on them
structurally.” Luhmann’s [2004 (1993), p. 381]
example is the reliance in economic communi-
cation on the fact that money will be generally
accepted. Structural couplings not only chan-
nel irritations; they trigger them (p. 383).
The sort of structural couplings that most
interests Luhmann is the coupling between
societal subsystems. As will be discussed below,
Luhmann sees the economic and legal systems
as coupled through property and contract;
the political and legal systems are coupled
through constitutions. In each instance, the
coupling mechanism has different meaning in
the two systems (pp. 392, 400). The coupled
operations unfold in each system according
to that system’s procedures, standards, and
criteria. Structural coupling thus means that
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the autopoietic systems can be related in a way
other than boundary-crossing input and output
(pp. 381–82).
An important element of Luhmann’s the-
ory, and a point of connection for the notion
of structural coupling, is Luhmann’s concep-
tion of systems as evolving entities. He re-
jects the premise of earlier social-evolutionary
thought—social Darwinism, in particular—
that evolution implies progress [Luhmann 2012
(1997), p. 260]. He rejects also the idea of evolu-
tion as adaptation to the environment (pp. 69–
70, 253). Nor does he believe that evolutionary
advances are the solutions to preexisting prob-
lems. Instead, Luhmann argues, the problems
that are solved through advances “arise with the
advances” (p. 307).
All of that tells us only what evolution is
not. The central positive idea Luhmann [2004
(1993), pp. 230–31] retains from other evolu-
tionary approaches is that evolution involves
mechanisms of variation, selection, and restabi-
lization. Variation, he says, occurs at the level of
system elements or operations [Luhmann 2012
(1997), p. 273]—communication, in the case of
the comprehensive societal system, and system-
coded communication, in the case of functional
societal subsystems (such as the legal system).
An indeterminacy in legal doctrine, for exam-
ple, may produce different ways of understand-
ing and carrying forward past court decisions
(variation). The process of decision (selection)
carries forward and transforms system struc-
tures. Restabilization, in the evolution of living
beings rather than societies, is “performed by
the formation of populations” (p. 292). With so-
cietal systems, the term restabilization refers to
“sequences of building structural changes into a
system”—that is, making the selected structures
a more durable feature of the evolving system
(p. 294). It is concerned “primarily . . . with the
system itself in relation to its environment”
(p. 274). Functional subsystems—such as law,
economy, politics, and science—he maintains,
have more and more assumed the function
of restabilization for the societal system as a
whole. Luhmann distinguishes the idea of resta-
bilization from the older idea of equilibrium
between system and environment. Evolution is
not necessarily a harmonistic process.
For Luhmann, evolution is the transfor-
mation and renewal of a system’s relation to
its environment. His revised social evolution-
ary theory sees modern society’s evolution as
occurring largely through structural couplings
among functional subsystems. As Luhmann
puts it, “The onus of explanation is now on
the concept of ‘structural coupling’” (p. 269).
In this way, evolution becomes coevolution—
coordination, though not intentionally directed
or purposive [Luhmann 2004 (1993), pp. 231,
252; 2012 (1997), p. 307], in the evolution-
ary development of, for example, law and poli-
tics. Luhmann describes certain long-term pat-
terns of coevolution as structural drifts—for
example, “towards the welfare state, positive
law, and a decentralized economic development
controlled by budgets and balances” [Luhmann
2004 (1993), p. 421].
One final noteworthy aspect of Luhmann’s
general theory is its emphasis on paradox. His
conception of paradox is expansive, going well
beyond narrowly logical paradoxes. He refers,
for example, to the paradox of court decision:
“Courts have to decide even when they cannot
decide, or at least not within reasonable
standards of rationality” (p. 289). To most,
that claim would seem only to diagnose a
difficulty of judicial decision under conditions
of high complexity, not to state a paradox. The
term decide appears to be used in two senses:
(a) issue some ruling or another, however ill
founded and uncertain, versus (b) issue a ruling
that meets high standards of judicial rationality.
And so, few would speak here of a paradox.
Similarly, Luhmann refers to strict liability
as a paradox, because it “provides liability in
the case of legally produced harm” (p. 417). A
more natural explanation of (American) strict
liability would note, more simply, that it is a
second principle of liability in a legal system
that more commonly grounds liability on fault.
Conduct subject to strict tort liability may
not be unlawful or illegal in the sense that the
actor is at fault or has committed a crime, but
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liability. Strict criminal liability is of course
more in tension with usual ideas of criminal
liability, but it seems amenable to the same
kind of explanation—that it is a secondary
principle of liability, invoked either for good
policy reasons or perhaps sometimes simply as
a matter of history and inertia [cf. Hart 1994
(1961), p. 173, suggesting that strict liability in
morality, but not in law, “at least approaches a
contradiction in terms”]. These broad uses of
paradox seem to me unproductive.6
Much more interesting and productive is
Luhmann’s use of paradoxes of self-reference.
Here the ordinary meaning of paradox is not
strained, and Luhmann is able to generate novel
insights and perspectives. The most basic exam-
ple of a self-referential paradox concerns the
application of a binary subsystem code—such
as legal/illegal or true/false—to itself [see, e.g.,
Luhmann 2004 (1993), pp. 102, 182, 187, 191.)
Is the distinction between legal and illegal, ba-
sic to communication within the legal system,
itself legal or illegal? If (as it appears) it can-
not be said to be either, then there would ap-
pear to be a foundational problem, or problem
of origins, for the legal system (p. 227)—and,
by extension, for every subsystem with coded
communication. In the legal system, as will be
discussed below, the problem appears if one
asks what makes the legal system’s basic law,
the constitution, valid. Of course H.L.A. Hart
worked this same ground in arguing that the ul-
timate basis of legal validity, the so-called rule of
recognition, is neither legally valid nor legally
invalid. The issue in the discussion below will be
6Other alleged paradoxes that would seem to fit in this
category are (a) the sovereignty of the people, when (says
Luhmann) the people collectively are “the one who cannot
decide at all” [Luhmann 2004 (1993), p. 365]; (b) the para-
dox of the objective validity of subjective rights (p. 415); and
(c) law’s positivity, that is, the circumstance that “law is valid
for the very reason that it can be changed” (p. 452). More
promising, in my opinion, and distinct from the paradoxes
of self-reference mentioned below in text, are (a) the para-
doxes of total freedom and total equality (p. 226) and (b) the
paradox of modern sovereignty, that is, “the binding of nec-
essarily unbound authority” (p. 408). For investigations into
Luhmannian legal paradoxes, see, for example, the essays col-
lected in Perez & Teubner (2006).
whether Luhmann’s systems theory offers new
insights into this recognized problem.
Luhmann connects the idea of paradox
to the idea of observation. By that term, he
“means simply distinguishing and indicating”
[Luhmann 2012 (1997), pp. 34, 69]. That means
drawing a distinction and marking—a synonym
for indicating (see Borch 2011, p. 52)—one side
or the other. Consider an example. A system’s
code, of course, is a distinction, and a legal
decision will use the distinction between legal
and illegal and indicate or mark some conduct
as legal and some as illegal. An observation
is a communication and thus an operation of
the system [Luhmann 2012 (1997), p. 325]. It
marks or indicates one side of the distinction by
using the system’s own standards and criteria—
for example, the legal system’s criteria for
legality or illegality. Luhmann [2004 (1993),
p. 460] thus speaks of a schema of observation
generated within a system. Within every such
schema, Luhmann maintains, there is a blind
spot. The observational schema cannot be
observed from within itself. All attempts to do
so lead to paradox [King & Thornhill 2003,
pp. 19–20; Luhmann 2004 (1993), p. 460; 2012
(1997), pp. 45, 104, 326]. A special case of this
problem is the necessarily paradoxical result
of applying a system’s code to itself—asking,
for example, whether the distinction between
legal and illegal is legally valid (or invalid).
Paradox is not, in Luhmann’s view, fatal to
a system’s operations. A significant strand of
Luhmann’s thought develops the idea of para-
dox management. The foundational idea here
is the distinction between first- and second-
order observation [Luhmann 2012 (1997),
p. 224]. First-order observation is a system’s
ordinary communication—its observation of
the world in terms of the subsystem’s code
(e.g., legal/illegal). Second-order observation,
by contrast, is a system’s observation of its own
first-order observation—or, one might say, a
system’s reflexive understanding of the way
in which it operates. From this second-order
position, one may observe the way in which
first-order observers assign code values (e.g.,
legal and illegal). But because second-order
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observation is not itself the assigning of code
values, it can avoid the question of whether
the first-order observational schema should be
assigned the positive (legal) or negative (illegal)
code value. Put differently, the blind spot of
first-order observation can become apparent.
As Luhmann would phrase it, one can see (in
second-order observation) what one cannot see
(in first-order observation). Of course, second-
order observation has its own blind spot—it
cannot observe its own observational schema
in the course of employing that very schema
[Luhmann 2004 (1993), p. 460; 2012 (1997),
p. 45]. For that, one would need third-order
observation. Although in principle one could
thus speak of n-order observation, with no
limit on n’s magnitude, in practice Luhmann
speaks primarily of first- and second-order
observation, occasionally of third-order obser-
vation, and never in any systematic way of any
higher-order observation (Borch 2011, p. 59).
A second term Luhmann uses in discussing
paradox management is unfolding. Second-
order observation, he says, is the unfolding
of (first-order) paradoxes [Luhmann 2004
(1993), p. 212]. This unfolding involves, in
his analysis, the reentry of the distinction
between system and environment into the
system’s communication [Luhmann 2012
(1997), pp. 105–6]. Luhmann refers to this as a
distinction, within a system’s communication,
between self-reference and external (or other-)
reference. Through this reentry of the system’s
distinction from its environment, legal commu-
nication can “observe its own operations and
their effects” [Luhmann 2004 (1993), p. 105].
Luhmann’s explanations for how reentry can
manage or unfold paradox are not well de-
veloped at the level of general theory. More
clear, however, and taken up below, are his ac-
counts of how this sort of deparadoxification
takes place in the legal system in particular. At
the level of general theory, Luhmann argues
that the dissolution of paradoxes “has to be me-
diated by mechanisms of structural coupling”
(p. 409). The coupling he discusses most is the
link between law and politics provided by the
constitution.
LUHMANN’S THEORY
OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM
Luhmann’s Conception of Legal
Theory and Its Role
Luhmann and legal positivism. Luhmann
insists that law is a separate subsystem of
society, differentiated from politics as well as
from morality. Only the law, and not politics
or morality or any other system of communi-
cation, determines what the law is. The idea of
operative closure “above all opposes the idea
that morality could immediately or intrinsically
be understood as valid in the legal system”
[Luhmann 2004 (1993), p. 107; see also
pp. 108, 115]. “Morality as such,” Luhmann
maintains, “has no legal relevance” (p. 112). In
these senses, Luhmann’s thinking aligns with
the main line of legal positivism. In further
claims, Luhmann echoes particular variants
of legal positivism. References to extralegal
concepts and criteria are increasing, Luhmann
notes, particularly in judicial (and especially
constitutional) decisions. But they are juridified
when incorporated, and thus they may have
a different and specifically legal meaning
within the legal system (pp. 113–14, 120–21,
213). Echoing Hart’s idea of secondary rules,
Luhmann notes that law not only restricts
conduct but also facilitates it. Luhmann par-
ticularly emphasizes contract as a device for
massive amounts of law creation, classifying it
as a category of legal decisions alongside court
rulings and legislation (pp. 104, 130). He notes
further, in agreement with Hart, that the law of
property and of corporation formation allows
private citizens to create law [p. 163; see also
p. 401 (describing law as giving private citizens
a slice of political power); accord Hart 1994
(1961), p. 41 (law of contracts, trusts, wills,
for example, makes a private citizen “a private
legislator”]. Finally, consonant with Hart,
Luhmann suggests that his approach still leaves
place for “a moral judgment of law” [Luhmann
2004 (1993), p. 225; cf. Hart 1994 (1961),
pp. 207–12]. To say, as Luhmann does, that
law is an autonomous system is not to say that it
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But Luhmann has little patience for the
old debate between positivism and theories of
natural law. Despite the persistence of this long-
running jurisprudential debate, the idea of legal
positivity has lacked a genuine counterconcept
since the decline of medieval ideas of divine law
[Luhmann 2004 (1993), p. 77]. The substitute
distinction, “between law and morals,” in
Luhmann’s view, “does nothing for legal the-
ory” beyond “providing confirmation that law
is positive law and that it can also be assessed
morally (without immediate legal effects)”
(p. 77). If we retain the idea of legal positivism,
he says, it would be only “more or less a matter
of semantic tactics” (p. 454). The standard posi-
tions in the perennial debate, which Luhmann
characterizes as positivity and reason, are
eighteenth-century formulae that “have too lit-
tle complexity, and overvalue and homogenize
the points of view that guide them” (p. 448).
Luhmann’s disinterest in conventional
debates over legal positivism is not just a
matter of ennui. He rejects, first, the idea,
common to many nonpositivist approaches as
well, that a legal system is to be understood as
a collection or system of rules. Hart’s idea of
law as union of primary and secondary rules
is in fact “precisely . . . the target of the con-
cept of autopoiesis” (p. 130). The elements of
Luhmann’s legal system are communications—
operations—and not rules. Further, Luhmann
rejects the idea, common in positivist theories,
of a hierarchy of rules resting on an ultimate
rule of recognition (Hart) or Grundnorm (Hans
Kelsen). Luhmann defends a temporal rather
than hierarchical theory of legal validity: “The
only available test,” he writes, “is the success
of the ongoing change of the status of the
system’s validity, of the ongoing connecting of
one operation to the next, of the autopoiesis
of the system” (p. 131). The governing image
is not hierarchy but recursive connection. In
place of the old positivist idea of hierarchical
sources of law, Luhmann proposes the idea
of legal validity—to be discussed below—as
circulating symbol. And this symbol is not
static but dynamic, as it “refers to changes in
the state of law” (pp. 124, 130, 443, 473).
But although he rejects the idea of law’s
foundation in an ultimate rule of recognition
or Grundnorm, Luhmann retains and develops
Hart’s idea that law ultimately cannot ground
itself as legally valid. He frames the problem as
one of paradox in the self-application of law’s le-
gal/illegal code (pp. 227, 284). Still, unlike Hart,
Luhmann sees law’s basic paradox as genera-
tive. Paradoxical though these attempted solu-
tions remain, from the basic paradox have been
developed successively the ideas of the king as
sovereign, the sovereignty of the people as a
collective body, and the foundational charac-
ter of a written constitution (see pp. 362, 365,
409). As is his usual pattern, and as will be dis-
cussed below, Luhmann addresses these strate-
gies of paradox management through the idea of
structural coupling—specifically, the coupling
between law and politics that the constitution
establishes.
Legal theory as the legal system’s self-
description. According to Luhmann, systems
such as the legal system may be described
either from the inside or from the outside. But
even an external description, he thinks, needs
to present law “as a system that describes itself
and constructs theory about itself” [Luhmann
2004 (1993), pp. 422–23]. Luhmann presents
a system’s self-description as a special form
of observation, one that reflects “the unity of
the system” (p. 424). In contrast to ordinary
legal theories one finds at work in court
decisions or in legal arguments, legal theory
as self-description does not necessarily guide
everyday legal practice (p. 425). Still, according
to Luhmann, the legal system’s self-description
must accept, among other things, the system’s
binary legal/illegal code, the idea (most usually
associated with the late Ronald Dworkin) of
“only one correct decision” in each case, and
the principle that decisions should rest on good
legal reasons and should be respected (p. 428).
Obviously the idea that the legal system
is describing itself and theorizing about it-
self is counterintuitive. Yet it follows from
Luhmann’s initial theoretical decision to focus
on systems rather than persons or groups and to
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see those systems as constituted by communi-
cations rather than persons who communicate.
Luhmann insists that his exile of the knowing
human (or transcendental) subject from the
center of his theory does not simply reinstate
that unitary subject, this time as a supraindivid-
ual thinking, perceiving, self-describing system
of communication. An adequate description of
the activity of legal theory, however, must see
the multiple conflicting theories and multiple
perspectives from which those theories could
be said to issue. If we can say that the legal
system describes itself in legal theory, it may be
simply that within the collection of communi-
cations that invoke or otherwise appropriately
concern the legal/illegal code—the elements
of the legal system—some of them meet the
criteria for self-description that Luhmann
has set forth. Luhmann’s own account of the
history of legal theory follows a path that
to most would seem more straightforward,
referring for example not to the legal system’s
generation of positivist theories, but to the
positivist theories put forth by Hart and Kelsen.
I find it at least questionable whether anything
is gained by the locution “the system describes
itself.” I continue to pursue this point below.
The Center/Periphery Model of the
Legal System’s Internal Structure
Luhmann sees the system of world society as
differentiated functionally into subsystems for
(to name his usual examples) economy, poli-
tics, law, science, education, the mass media,
medical care, religion, art, and family. Although
functional differentiation is the primary form
[Luhmann 2012 (1997), p. 109], the political
and legal systems are in Luhmann’s view re-
gionally differentiated as well (p. 96). This of
course is Luhmann’s concession to the contin-
ued existence of the so-called nation-state. Al-
though other systems show regional variations
in development, Luhmann sees these differ-
ences as showing nonetheless congruent trends
and as consistent with “the unity of the sys-
tem of [world] society” (pp. 92–93, 96). With
many other contemporary thinkers, Luhmann
believes that it no longer makes sense to speak
of, in particular, national economies.
The internal structure of the functionally
differentiated legal system reflects a distinct and
apparently rather old form of differentiation,
“one that predates modern forms of differentia-
tion.” Luhmann describes this form as a distinc-
tion between center and periphery. The pre-
modern arrangement Luhmann [2004 (1993),
p. 302] has in mind is the old difference between
town and country. In his center/periphery
schema, courts occupy the center. But center
does not mean most important (p. 292). Luh-
mann’s theory is not court centered in the way
that American legal theory traditionally was
court centered.7 Similarly, the periphery is pe-
ripheral not in the sense of being unimportant;
it is peripheral in that it is the contact zone for
other functional systems. Luhmann places at
the periphery legislation and contract, which,
we will see, establish structural couplings to the
political and economic systems, respectively.
Luhmann does not explain a certain cate-
gory difference here. The center of the legal
system, the subsystem of courts (p. 275), is a
network of institutions. The periphery, by con-
trast, is stocked with either two forms of le-
gal communication (legislation, contract) or the
various communications that exemplify those
forms (the various statutes and contracts his-
torically found in the legal system). With his
insistence that systems have elements and that
those elements are communications, one would
think that Luhmann would describe the legal
system’s internal differentiation as a differen-
tiation of communications. The presence of
courts, rather than judicial communications (es-
pecially opinions but also, for example, court
rules), seems an unusual feature.
7A good example is Dworkin’s (1986) Law’s Empire, which in
its opening and closing pages places courts in the empire’s
capital city and crowns judges as the empire’s princes (see
pp. vii, 407). Dworkin defends courts’ centrality in ways that
Luhmann would reject. For a more extended treatment of
Luhmann’s center/periphery scheme and Dworkin’s empire
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But the function Luhmann assigns the legal
system’s center seems to require an institution
rather than a mere assemblage or network
of communications. The function is paradox
management. We have seen that for Luhmann,
the central paradox of the legal system is the
paradox of the legal code’s self-application—
the impossibility of determining whether the
distinction between legal and illegal is itself
legal or illegal. And if that question cannot
be answered, then how can the legal/illegal
distinction be applied to decide cases according
to law? This is the sense in which legal decision
itself is for Luhmann inherently paradoxical
(see pp. 283–84, 291).
Courts, according to Luhmann, have the
task of unfolding this paradox. He seems to
link his assignment of this task to the idea that
courts, alone among legal actors, are legally
compelled to decide. Although legislators and
those engaged in contract may refrain from
law-changing decisions, courts must decide all
cases properly before them (though of course
not necessarily on the merits). Presumably for
this reason, and probably also because he (like
more conventional thinkers) notes courts’ spe-
cial obligation to issue consistent decisions
(p. 297), Luhmann sees courts as charged with
unfolding the central paradox of legal decision.
Here Luhmann mentions also what above I
called a looser sense of paradox: the need to de-
cide without ever having full information and
sometimes without being able to meet “rea-
sonable standards of rationality” (p. 292). Un-
folding a paradox means working it out tempo-
rally rather than at a single moment. Courts’
task of paradox management therefore is ongo-
ing. I find Luhmann’s ideas most interesting in
connection with constitutional decision mak-
ing, and I take up that question in the section
on the constitution as mechanism of structural
coupling below.
Within this center of courts, Luhmann
identifies, in addition to functional and center/
periphery, a third sort of differentiation: hier-
archical. Federal courts in the United States,
of course, are arrayed from district court to re-
gional court of appeals to the Supreme Court;
state court systems have similar structures. As
the term regional court of appeals suggests,
territorial differentiation structures the federal
court system. And one sees a fourth sort of
internal functional differentiation as well: The
US Court of Federal Claims, US Court of
Appeals for Veterans Claims, and US Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit all are courts
with specialized subject-matter jurisdiction
(see pp. 294–95).
Luhmann does not address the point, but
within a federal system such as the United
States, national and state or provincial courts
are differentiated from one another partly
functionally and partly hierarchically. Federal
courts, of course, are courts of limited juris-
diction. Vast areas of the legal landscape are
governed by state rather than federal law. The
relation among the federal courts and state
courts seems to be one of functional differ-
entiation but with hierarchy as to federal-law
questions that the state courts decide (with re-
view sometimes available in the US Supreme
Court). Among the state systems of courts, the
relation seems to be nonhierarchical differen-
tiation based on territory. American courts as
a whole, of course, are differentiated territori-
ally from other nation-states’ courts (and have
structural couplings with territorially differen-
tiated political systems). This is part of the sense
in which Luhmann sees the legal system as still
differentiated territorially as well as function-
ally. These different forms of differentiation de-
termine the way in which a particular court’s
decisions link up with (or not) the decisions of
other courts. Ideas of precedential and merely
(more or less) persuasive authority are linked to
these forms of differentiation. Here too, once
one begins thinking matters through, it quickly
becomes clear that any talk of the legal system
communicating in one way or another is in an
important sense misleading. The legal system
of a world society is differentiated according to
several principles into various subsystems, and
so the parent system has no single voice and no
single apparatus of perception or thought.
One metaphor Luhmann uses to address
the relation between legal center and legal
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periphery is parallel processing (p. 296). Leg-
islatures and those engaged in contract also are
producers of legal validity, and they of course
also operate within space that is legally (among
other ways) structured. Free from the pressure
of compulsory legal decision, legislation and
contract can be more selective in channeling
irritations from the environment. Luhmann’s
understanding of the legal periphery is consis-
tent with contemporary theories of legal plu-
ralism. He identifies there the production not
just of state law (through formal state legisla-
tion) but also of “new forms of privately pro-
duced law.” Here Luhmann refers to “the in-
ternal law of organizations, and . . . law created
as a result of provisional collective agreements
between interest groups and other big organi-
zations, market-specific interpretations of gen-
eral regulations, the law of general terms and
conditions of trade, and others” (p. 293). Pre-
eminent among those (more or less strongly)
influenced by Luhmann in this respect is
Gunther Teubner (see, e.g., Teubner &
Febbrajo 1992; Teubner 1993, 2011).
Structural Coupling of Law
and Economy
Operations, considered as events, “can partici-
pate in different systems.” A payment pursuant
to a contract, in Luhmann’s example, is both
an economic communication and a legal com-
munication. Forms of structural coupling make
these links between systems more durable than
momentary events [Luhmann 1992a, p. 1437;
see also Luhmann 2004 (1993), p. 381]. As the
example suggests, contract is a prime form of
structural coupling that Luhmann sees between
the legal and economic systems. Property is the
other [Luhmann 2004 (1993), p. 383].
A form of structural coupling has different
meaning in the two systems’ networks of com-
munication. This is so even if the same term
may be used in the two systems. Consider the
idea of property and the related idea of inter-
ests. These terms have a double significance,
different in legal and economic communication
(p. 392). Since the legal realist movement of the
1930s, a popular legal metaphor for property
has been a bundle of rights, such as the rights
to use, to exclude, and to dispose of the prop-
erty and to reap benefits from it. These rights
correspond to economic interests. They are at-
tempts within legal communication to perceive
through external reference the legal system’s
economic environment. Viewed from the other
side, the economic significance of property de-
pends upon, among other things, whether and
to what extent the legal system will provide
enforceable protection to economic interests.
Those interests are meaningful in economic
communication as greater or lesser amounts of
fungible economic value. Economic communi-
cation thus selectively models or perceives legal
communication. Through the ideas of property
and interest, the two systems are structurally
coupled and mutually irritate and resonate with
one another.
Elsewhere I have examined in some detail
US constitutional takings law as an illustra-
tion of this coupling of law and economy (see
Baxter 1998, pp. 2046–57). The legal system’s
conception of property protected in takings
law is selective and has excluded many impor-
tant economic interests (such as employment,
government entitlements, tax exemptions, li-
censes, and money owed in taxes). And although
economic communication sees economic inter-
ests as fungible, differing only quantitatively
in money value, constitutional takings doctrine
ranks those interests qualitatively and norma-
tively, extending much more stringent consti-
tutional protection to interests in land, regard-
less of the amount of economic value at stake.
Further, among rights concerning land, the
Supreme Court has identified the right to ex-
clude as “one of the most treasured rights” and
“one of the most essential sticks in the bun-
dle” (Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp. 1982, p. 435). In the case from which
these words are taken, the Court provided con-
stitutional protection against an intrusion that
was minimal both physically and in economic
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amounting to one-eighth of a cubic foot in roof
space for which the owner “would have had
no other use” [Loretto 1982, p. 443 (Blackmun
J, dissenting)]. In another example of the di-
vergence between legal and economic under-
standings of land’s value, the Court acknowl-
edged in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council
(1992, p. 1020 n.8) that the rule it developed
might provide full compensation for a 100%
deprivation of value but no compensation at all
for a 95% diminution. This result seems eco-
nomically senseless. But from the perspective
of legal communication, the Court explained,
“takings law is full of these ‘all-or-nothing’
situations.”
One similarly can analyze contract as a
mechanism for structurally coupling law and
economy. The legal term contract has an eco-
nomic counterpart, exchange [Luhmann 2004
(1993), p. 393].8 In the idea of the expectation
interest, contract law models its economic en-
vironment, vindicating what it takes to be the
usual economic interest of a contracting party.
Application of the rule, through valuation of
this interest, requires a court or jury to ob-
serve at least a small slice of the economic sys-
tem. Economically minded commentators have
identified and endorsed other rules that re-
quire further economic observation and could
be thought to incorporate norms of economi-
cally reasonable behavior into contract law. Ex-
amples include the ideas of efficient breach, the
lost volume seller rule, and the (so-called) duty
to mitigate damages. The Uniform Commer-
cial Code can be understood in part as an at-
tempt to replace legalistic constructions with
increasingly economically sensitive inquiry. Its
parol evidence rule, for example, refers courts
and juries to “the commercial context” of con-
tractual terms and (ironically, it would seem)
“definitely rejects” the idea that written con-
tract terms gain meaning “by rules of construc-
8Unlike the case of property, according to Luhmann, there
is no term common to the two systems. (This claim might be
more plausible in German than in English.)
tion existing in the law” (see U.C.C. Sec. 2–
202, comment 1). The greater project of some
legal realists was to replace occasional and hap-
hazard connections between law and economy
with a more systematic observation of economy
in the law—and the reflexive incorporation of
this observation into the law itself. Viewed from
the other side, the Uniform Commercial Code
(for example) “treated businessmen,” not just
“lawyers and judges,” as “principal addressees”
(Twining 1973, p. 304).
Luhmann’s work provides a frame for an-
alyzing these connections between law and
economy—and for understanding their limits.
Despite their structural coupling—or perhaps
precisely because of their structural coupling—
law and economy remain separate systems. The
dream sometimes attributed to realism—that
law might one day mirror the world of eco-
nomic transactions—was unrealizable, for rea-
sons Luhmann’s work can explain. Legal doc-
trine responds to internal pulls as well, and to
pulls also from politics, the other system to
which it is coupled. Luhmann notes also that
legal language, despite its specialization, is still
“a part of society’s language” [Luhmann 2004
(1993), p. 125]. Thus, moral conceptions also
may be taken up into law.9 And so contract doc-
trine includes also morally responsive notions
such as unconscionability, duress, and undue in-
fluence. Further, and perhaps even more inter-
esting, law’s observation of other social spheres
is structured, enabled, and limited by its rules
(particularly its rules of evidence), standards,
and procedures. Those rules and procedures
are not identical to the ones found in its en-
vironment, whether we think of the economic
system or (to consider the system specialized in
knowledge production) science. One of course
can seek to improve law’s ability to perceive or
model its social environment, but the two sys-
tems still will remain distinct.
9With respect to constitutional law, Luhmann usually treats
the reference to or incorporation of moral norms as an occa-
sion for criticism [see, e.g., Luhmann 2004 (1993), pp. 233–
343, 411–12].
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Structural Coupling of Law
and Politics
Law and politics as separate but coupled
systems. Not all theorists, or even all sys-
tems theorists [see Luhmann 2004 (1993),
p. 357], would accept Luhmann’s distinction
between the legal and political systems. Luh-
mann’s longtime theoretical adversary Jürgen
Habermas, for example, treats courts and leg-
islatures alike as part of the political system’s
institutional complex. He writes, “Less plau-
sible is Luhmann’s . . . step of taking modern
law out of politics . . . and giving it independent
status as its own subsystem alongside the
administration, economy, family, and the like”
(Habermas 1996, p. 74). Luhmann intends his
idea of structural coupling to capture the obvi-
ous connections between law and politics, most
evident through legislation and political en-
forcement of judicial decisions. But at the same
time, Luhmann is perhaps able to retheorize
what mainstream legal theory has long sought
to identify and defend: a distinction between
law (especially judicial decision) and politics.
Writing from the context of German legal
and political theory, terminology poses a barrier
for Luhmann that is not so evident in English.
The German term Rechtsstaat, sometimes trans-
lated as constitutional state, compounds the
terms for law and state into a single word. This
formula has tended to conceal the fact that law
and politics are “different systems, both being
operatively closed, having different functions,
different codes, and different code-dependent
programmes” [Luhmann 2004 (1993), p. 364].
Further, they have different temporality and
time pressures, with the legal system sometimes
operating too slowly for political needs. Legis-
lation, a key mechanism for structurally cou-
pling law and politics, operates to “balance”
these “societal time-differences” (pp. 371–74,
382). The legal system’s center, the courts, op-
erates through argumentation and reasoned de-
cision in ways not exactly paralleled even in
democratic politics. As for the periphery, the
very same event—for example, the enactment
of a statute—can have different meanings in the
two systems. Within politics, successful legisla-
tion “can be counted as a political success, as
it marks the end to lengthy efforts to achieve a
consensus.” A statute’s political story is distinc-
tive, “a history of ‘talk,’ of strategic position-
ing, of operations under the schema of govern-
ment and opposition, of negotiations, of public
declarations of intention and the secondary in-
tention of testing public opinion, etc.” Within
the legal system, by contrast, a statute’s enact-
ment “changes the state of validity of the law
and serves as an instruction to courts and, be-
yond that, to everyone who wants to know what
is legal and what is illegal” (p. 377).
Luhmann, however, sometimes obscures the
point he himself is trying to make. Here are
two examples. First, he posits two codes for the
political system: one, the distinction between
government and opposition, and the other, the
distinction between governing and governed
(see pp. 420–21, 436). On its face, having two
system-defining codes for a single system would
seem to be a mistake. True, he posits two codes
for the economic system as well—one related
to property and the other to money. But he
handles the tension there by treating one as
evolutionarily primary and the other as evo-
lutionarily secondary (pp. 214, 220, 233). No
such move seems available for the above two
political-system codes. Still, Luhmann’s prob-
lem seems avoidable. He could present the po-
litical system’s code more simply as the dis-
tinction between having and not having power.
This single code then could be specified differ-
ently depending on whether one analyzed the
vertical dimension of power’s application or the
horizontal dimension of competition for power.
A second way in which Luhmann seems to
undermine his own idea of a political system,
distinct in coding from the legal system, is his
introduction of yet another complication in the
political system’s coding. Here, as he did with
the economic system, he develops the idea of an
evolutionarily secondary coding: the “legal cod-
ing of power” established with the Rechtsstaat
or constitutional state (p. 213; see also p. 220).
This idea of an evolutionarily secondary
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system’s unity in a way that the analytical rela-
tion between government/opposition and gov-
erning/governed at first did not. But to describe
the political system’s medium, power, as coded
through the legal system’s medium, law, is to
undermine the idea of separate political and le-
gal systems. The idea of system-specific codes
and media, after all, is Luhmann’s fundamental
basis for distinguishing between systems.
Luhmann suggests a way out of this diffi-
culty with an alternative formulation. Law does
not code political power, he indicates at one
point; instead, the political system’s adminis-
trative apparatus is “programmed in the form
of law” (p. 366). This formulation seems more
promising. The two systems’ communications
comprehend law in very different ways. From
the side of the legal system, law has an inter-
nal culture, based in a specific form of argu-
mentation. For a question to count as a legal
question, Luhmann notes, it must take on a
particular form. Such is the function of ideas
such as justiciability: “Problems must be turned
into justiciable form to have access to law. This
means that they can be defined recursively in
relation to the historical condition of the legal
system and the validity of law.”10 Further, legal
claims typically must be articulated specifically
as rights claims (p. 366). From the perspective
of law, there is no law-free space (p. 368). But
from the side of the political system, by con-
trast, law appears simply as an instrument for
realizing political goals (p. 370).
The Constitution as mechanism of struc-
tural coupling. Luhmann proposes an
additional coding for the legal system: the
distinction between constitutional and non-
constitutional law that developed, of course,
with the rise of the constitutional state (p. 120).
Constitutional law exempts itself from the usual
rule that new law trumps old (p. 405). Further,
10Obviously, such doctrines can be more or less restrictive.
But some version of a justiciability requirement seems un-
avoidable. To take Luhmann’s [2004 (1993), p. 366] exam-
ple, it seems unimaginable that a court could have decided
the question of whether to reunify Germany.
as the foundational document of a legal system
and source of that system’s legal validity, the
constitution’s own validity cannot be estab-
lished through ordinary legal means (p. 126).
This last point is, of course, a version of
law’s foundational paradox—the impossibility
of establishing legally the validity of the le-
gal/illegal code—and a version of Hart’s prob-
lem of foundation for the rule of recognition.
Hart’s strategy is to ground the rule of recog-
nition in the fact of its acceptance, especially
official acceptance (see Hart 1994, pp. 100–17).
It makes no sense, he argues, to say that the ul-
timate standard of legal validity is either legally
valid or legally invalid (pp. 107–8). Luhmann
describes the strategy adopted in the Ameri-
can Constitution: “The constitution itself con-
tains the proclamation of the constitution and
externalizes this symbolically by a reference
to the . . . will of the people” [Luhmann 2004
(1993), p. 406]. The legal system, in Luhmann’s
term, thus externalizes the paradox by referring
it to politics—in this case, however, extraordi-
nary politics.
None of this of course changes the fact
that the Constitution’s framers ignored the
conditions for amendment stated in the Con-
stitution’s predecessor document, the Articles
of Confederation, choosing to write an entirely
new document rather than amend the old.
If law is law only by reference to prior law,
then the Constitution is not law. The solution
to law’s fundamental paradox is not a legal
solution, says Luhmann, but instead a political
solution (p. 410).
Recall that, according to Luhmann, the
dissolution of systems’ paradoxes “has to be me-
diated by mechanisms of structural coupling”
(p. 409). Unsurprisingly, then, he characterizes
the constitution as a mechanism of structural
coupling. As such a mechanism, it has a double
significance, with different meaning in each of
the coupled systems. “For the legal system it is
a supreme statute, a basic law. For the political
system it is an instrument of politics” (p. 410).
This mechanism of structural coupling offers
an unfolding or dissolution for the politi-
cal system’s own foundational paradox: the
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paradox of sovereignty, that is, “the paradox of
the binding of necessarily unbound authority”
(p. 408). The constitution operates as an
instrument of politics in prescribing conditions
for the legal exercise of power. In Luhmann’s
(perhaps misleading) term, the constitution
legally codes political power. And so the mech-
anism of structural coupling, the constitution,
“provides political solutions for the problem of
the self-reference of the legal system and legal
solutions for the problem of the self-reference
of the political system” (p. 410).
Unlike Hart’s solution to law’s basic
paradox, Luhmann’s unfolding of the paradox
does not depend simply upon a hierarchy of
norms. In one of the more difficult arguments
in Luhmann’s theory of the legal system, he
introduces, in addition to the legal/illegal code,
the idea of legal validity as a circulating sym-
bol. Of law’s foundational paradox, Luhmann
first mentions Hart’s and Kelsen’s proposed
solution through normative hierarchy and then
writes:
The most convincing solution of the problem
posed in this way is by reference to the lan-
guage that is in practice used by lawyers. The
starting point for this line of thought is the
following: all law is valid law. Law which is
not valid is not law. It follows that the rule
that makes validity recognizable cannot be
one of the valid rules. There cannot be any
rule in the system that regulates the applica-
bility/nonapplicability of all the rules of the
system. (p. 125)
It would at first seem odd, of course, to ad-
dress a paradox with a tautology (“all law is valid
law”). Luhmann’s point is that legal validity, in
his specific sense here, “is not a norm, and it
is neither a basic norm nor a meta-norm. . . .
What is valid in the legal system is not what
ought to be valid—it is valid or not” (p. 126).
Validity is “not a norm but a form”—that is, in
Luhmann’s general theory, a distinction with
an internal side and an external side (valid and
not valid, respectively). Luhmann describes the
idea of validity as “a symbol for the unity of
law” and “a symbol for the dynamic stability of
the system” (i.e., its persistence through legal
change). The idea of validity does not ground
the legal system; instead, it is a product of the
very legal operations that it qualifies. In Luh-
mann’s systems-theoretical vocabulary, “valid-
ity is an eigenvalue of the legal system; namely
a value that is constituted by the recursive per-
formance of the system’s own operations and
one that cannot be used anywhere else” (pp. 124–
25, emphasis in original). In another formula-
tion, Luhmann describes validity as a circulat-
ing symbol (p. 130).
All of this is, at the very least, an innova-
tive approach to an age-old problem: the basic
paradox of law.
CONCLUSION
In closing, rather than recap the theory, I want
to suggest two significant remaining difficulties
and indicate what might be the broadest appeal
of the theory. The first difficulty concerns
drawing the bounds of the legal and political
systems in particular.11 Luhmann’s theory
of society is a theory of world society. With
respect to some of the subsystems he identifies,
this makes considerable sense—especially with
respect to the economy and science (there
are no national scientific systems!), but also
religion, art, and probably the mass media. But
as Luhmann allows, territorial differentiation
still persists with political systems and, he
would say because the systems are structurally
coupled, with legal systems as well. There is an
international political order and principles of
international and transnational law with some
entities that make and enforce such law. But the
idea of a world political system, or a world legal
system, has hardly been realized. Whether
Luhmann’s work has the means necessary to
analyze the maze of political and legal orders,
some (as in federal systems) operating within
11The education system probably should be included here as
well, given that at least for primary and secondary education,
it is so closely linked to governments and thus suffers from











































































LS09CH08-Baxter ARI 26 September 2013 12:16
the same territorial bounds, I leave to others.
His successors, most notably Teubner, have
set out on this general task (see Teubner 2011,
2012). Exploration of this work would require
another article; perhaps the present one will
make Teubner’s work more accessible.
A second difficulty is that many theorists
will reject Luhmann’s work because it is
constructed so as to unask, one might say,
questions of differential social, economic, and
political power. Luhmann, often polemical,
is perhaps at his most polemical when he ad-
dresses those who want a social or legal theory
to have a (leftist) critical edge. For theorists
of this persuasion, Luhmann’s work unalloyed
would be insufficient. But many inspired by
Luhmann’s work occupy the left-hand side of
the political spectrum. Teubner is one such
thinker; Marx-inspired sociologist Bob Jessop
is another (see Jessop 1990).
Still, many legal theorists, and even many
sociologists of law, will find Luhmann’s work
unattractive for a variety of reasons, not all of
them political. I want to suggest, however, that
Luhmann’s formulation of boundary problems
is a source of his work’s strength as well as
its difficulty. The idea of social subsystems as
distinct but structurally coupled poses a prob-
lem for differentiated modern society (or if one
prefers, societies): How do the various sub-
systems (or if one prefers, discourses) fit to-
gether? The problem is particularly acute for
law and politics, both of which systems have
ambitions to regulate and direct the other so-
cial spheres. Luhmann’s theory suggests that
regulation must both link up with and respect
the autonomous logic of the regulated sphere
and also maintain the autonomous logic of the
regulating sphere (whether law or politics). In
thinking about regulation and such boundary
problems, Luhmann’s work, even if unpalatable
as a full-scale substantive theory, can be un-
derstood as a methodological recommendation:
Think from the inside out, and attend to the
differences across systems that even the same
term (e.g., constitution, property, negligence,
insanity) might have.
The same sort of caution seems appropriate
for those engaged in interdisciplinary scholar-
ship. It seems appropriate, also, for those—legal
theorists or otherwise—who have ambitions for
their work to affect the wider social world.
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